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INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF THE SALE OF A

CITRUS GROVE AND UNHARVESTED CROP
WILLIAM

R.

FRAZIER

Of particular importance to the Florida citrus industry is the
problem of proper tax treatment of gain realized from the sale of a
citrus grove at a time when an unharvested crop is on the trees. The
precise problem is whether the part of the gain properly allocable
to the unharvested crop may receive the preferred treatment as a
capital gain' accorded by Section 117 (j) of the Internal Revenue Code2
or whether it is taxable as ordinary income.
In 1946 the Bureau of Internal Revenue ruled that part of any
gain realized in a transaction involving the sale of land with an unharvested crop must be allocated to the crop and treated as ordinary
income. 3 The Tax Court has agreed with this ruling in four decisions,4
but two federal district courts in refund proceedings have disagreed
with the Bureau's position. 5 Moreover, opinion among the federal
circuits is not uniform. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth 6 and
Tenth7 Circuits, acting upon taxpayer's appeals, reversed two of the
four decisions rendered by the Tax Court. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, affirmed another of
the decisions of the Tax Court.8 The result is, of course, that a con'Although not technically correct, the term "capital gain" is used in this article
to mean long-term capital gain unless otherwise indicated.
2
INT. REV. CODE § 117 (a) (1) excludes from the definition of capital assets both
depreciable property and real property used in trade or business. Sec. 117 (j), enacted as §151 of the Revenue Act of 1942, applicable to taxable years beginning
after Dec. 31, 1941, provides that net gains realized on the sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of property subject to an allowance for depreciation and
real property used in trade or business and held for more than six months shall
be considered as capital gains. The rule is not invariable but depends on the net
result of all Section 117(j) transactions during the taxable year.
31.T. 3815, 1946-2 CuM. BuLL. 30.
4Estate of Harry L. Miller, P-H 1951 TC MEM. DEC. 151,064 (1951); Louise
Owen, P-H 1950 TC MEss. DEC. ff50,300 (1950); Thomas J. McCoy, 15 T.C. 828
(1950); Ernest A. Watson, 15 T.C. 800 (1950).
5Cole v. Smyth, 96 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Irrgang v. Fahs, 94 F. Supp.
206 (S.D. Fla. 1950).
6

Owen v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1951).
7McCoy v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1951).
sWatson v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1952).
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flict on the point currently exists between the Fifth and Tenth Circuits on the one hand and the Ninth Circuit on the other. This conflict may eventually be resolved by the Supreme Court.
A recent amendment to Section 117 (j), applicable to taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1950, in effect codifies the result reached
by the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. 9 It specifically provides that an unharvested crop sold as a part of land used in trade or business and
held for more than six months is to be considered property used in a
trade or business and therefore subject to capital gain treatment.' 0
If a loss is suffered in a single transaction, the entire loss is treated as
an ordinary loss.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the various decisions
that gave rise to the present conflict and to discuss the recent legislation on the subject and its application to the taxable years for which
it is effective.
LAw PRIoR TO REVENUE Acr oF 1951

The following discussion is confined to taxable years beginning
prior to January 1, 1951. This limitation is necessitated by reason of
the changes made by the enactment of Section 323 of the Revenue
Act of 1951.11 The provisions of the amendment will be developed
in detail hereinafter.
Position of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
The controversy between the Bureau and the various taxpayers
concerned began shortly after the Bureau published its ruling designated I.T. 3815.12 This ruling provides in effect that in instances in
which citrus groves are sold with fruit on the trees for a lump sum
consideration a portion of the selling price must be allocated to the
fruit and the balance to the land, trees, and other assets involved.
Gain from the sale properly allocable to fruit on the trees would constitute ordinary income; gain from the sale of land and trees would
9Revenue Act of 1951, §323, 65 STAT. 497, 26 U.S.C.A. §117 0) (1) (Supp. 1951).
loThroughout this article reference is made to the sale of a citrus grove and
unharvested crop. The problems discussed, however, are equally applicable to the
sale of any other type of farm property and growing crop.
"See note 9 supra.
121946-1 CuM. BULL. 30.
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be treated as capital gain under Section 117 (j),13 assuming that the
recognized gains from all such transactions coming within the purview of the section exceed the recognized losses thereunder.
The transactions covered by the ruling generally involve sales of
land and trees bearing unharvested fruit for a lump sum consideration without prorating any part of the sales price to the various assets
involved. Occasionally, however, the parties themselves agree to an
apportionment of the sales price. Such an agreement, if reasonable,
is binding in the event a controversy arises over the correct allocation.
In the absence of an agreement by the parties the fair market value
of the crop at the date of sale must be allocated as set forth in I. T.
3815.14

Position of the Tax Court
As might be expected, it was not long after the publication of I. T.
3815 that litigation testing the validity of the ruling was presented
to the Tax Court. The first of several such cases was Ernest A. Wat-5The relevant part of INT. REv. CODE §117Tj), prior to its amendment in
1951, provided that
"(1) ... the term 'property used in the trade or business' means property used
in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 23 (1), held for more than 6 months, and real
property used in the trade or business, held for more than 6 months, which is not
(A) property of a kind which would properly be includible in the inventory of
the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or (B) property held by
the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business ....
"(2) General rule. If, during the taxable year, the recognized gains upon sales
or exchanges of property used in the trade or business, plus the recognized gains
from the compulsory or involuntary conversion . . .of property used in the trade
or business and capital assets held for more than 6 months into other property or
money, exceed the recognized losses from such sales, exchanges, and conversions,
such gains and losses shall be considered as gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets held for more than 6 months. If such gains do not exceed
such losses, such gains and losses shall not be considered as gains and losses from
sales or exchanges of capital assets."
14Although not specifically mentioned in I.T. 3815, the ruling is implicitly
grounded on the doctrine of Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945), in
which Judge Learned Hand held that the sale of a going business for a lump sum
is not to be considered the sale of a single asset, but instead must be comminuted
into its fragments. Consequently, the total consideration must be broken down
among the various assets involved in order to determine the proper tax treatment
to be accorded the buyer and seller.
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son.15 The petition of the taxpayer was filed with the Tax Court
on June 1, 1948, and the opinion of the court was promulgated
December 7, 1950. The essential facts of the Watson case are typical
of those found in this type of litigation. The taxpayer and two members of her family each owned a one-third undivided interest in a
115-acre tract of land, of which 110 acres were in oranges and 5 acres
in peaches. On August 10, 1944, the taxpayer and her co-owners entered into a contract for the sale of this property, together with improvements, water rights, and the equipment thereon, for a lump
sum consideration of $197,000. They had owned the property in
question since December 31, 1941. The property was delivered on
September 1, 1944, pursuant to the agreement of August 10, 1944,
which treated the sale in its entirety as a sale of real property and
made no allocation of the sales price. At the time of the sale the
orange trees had a crop of immature fruit, which would not be ready
for market for a minimum of three months. In determining the deficiency the Commissioner held that of the total selling price of
$197,000 the sum of $122,500 was attributable to the fruit on the
trees, and taxed one third of that amount, or $40,833.33,18 to the taxpayer as ordinary income.
A majority of the Tax Court upheld in principle the Commissioner's determination. The taxpayer made two basic contentions.
First, she argued that Section 117 (j) applied, for the reason that, if
any part of the gain from the sale of the property as a whole was
properly attributable to the oranges on the trees at the time of sale,
it was nevertheless gain realized from the sale of real estate used in
the business of owning and operating the orange grove property.1 7 To
support this contention the taxpayer further argued that the nature
and character of the property rights in her case were governed by state
law and that, under the law of California and the general law of
most states, fruit growing on the trees at the time of sale of a grove
constitutes a part of the realty. s The majority of the Tax Court re1515 T.C. 800

(1950).

loIn this type of case the taxpayer will have invariably reported his entire
profit on the sale as capital gain. In general, therefore, the deficiency determined
by the Commissioner under I.T. 3815 will equal the tax on the gain attributable

to the fruit treated as ordinary income, reduced by the amount of the tax that
arose from treating such gain as capital gain.
17Ernest A. Watson, 15 T.C. 800, 807 (1950).

lsThe Supreme Court of Florida several years ago held that growing crops
are a part of the realty and pass with a conveyance of the land unless expressly
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jected the property theory and held that ". . . it is the purpose for
which the property is acquired or held or the use to which it is put
that supplies the answer." 19
There is little to criticize in the majority's holding respecting this
contention. The mere fact that under state law growing crops may
be regarded as an integral part of realty, or the fact that sale of land
plus growing crops is considered a sale of real property, appears insufficient in itself to justify capital gain treatment. The ultimate test
of taxability under Section 117 (j) should, it is submitted, turn on
whether the unharvested crop at the time of sale constitutes property
held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.
The second contention made by the taxpayer in the Watson case
was that the oranges in this instance were not held primarily for sale
to customers in the course of her trade or business, because she was
not in the business of producing and selling green oranges.20 The
majority of the court rejected this contention also, apparently on the
theory that the taxpayer's ultimate purpose in producing the crop
in the first instance was to sell the fruit; the crop, whether mature
or immature at the date of sale, constituted property held primarily
for sale.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Black 21 took issue with the majority holding on the second contention. The position of the dissent
was, in substance, that, although it is immaterial whether growing
crops are considered realty or personalty, the fruit did not constitute
property held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business
while in a state of immaturity.
Another issue raised in the Watson case is worthy of comment.
The Commissioner, in determining the deficiency asserted, did not
make any apportionment of the selling expenses between the fruit
on the trees and the other assets sold. This had the result of increasing the effective tax attributable to the profit on the fruit. The majority of the Tax Court, however, in accordance with the Commissioner's concession on brief, held that the selling expenses should be
allocated between the crop and other assets in the proportion that the
reserved by the seller, Adams v. Adams, 158 Fla. 173, 28 So.2d 254 (1946). For
a discussion of this question and an extensive citation of authorities see 15 AM.

JuR. 200; 25 C.J.S. 7.
1915 T.C. 800, 812 (1950).
20d. at 814.
21d. at 816.
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selling price allocable to each bore to the total selling price.
Such an allocation of selling expense is a factor to consider should
the whole question of the proper method of taxing pre-1951 sales
of land and growing crops be ultimately decided against the taxpayer
by the Supreme Court. If the conflict is resolved in favor of the taxpayer, then all selling expenses will be charged as an offset against
22
the price realized on the sale of the property.
The Tax Court, on the authority of its decision in the Watson
case, upheld similar determinations of the Commissioner in the cases
of Thomas J. McCoy, 23 Louise Owen,2 4 and Estate of Harry L.
Miller.2 5 The only material factual distinction between these subsequent decisions and the Watson case is that the McCoy case involved
the sale of a Kansas wheat farm and immature crop for a lump sum;
and the Owen case was concerned with the sale of two Florida citrus
groves and fruit, a substantial part of which was fully mature and
ready for market at the time of sale.
Position of Fifth and Tenth Circuits
The taxpayer in the Owen case appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Firth Circuit. In reversing the Tax Court Judge Strum reasoned:23
"Petitioner's ordinary business was selling citrus fruit as
personalty, altogether severed from the realty. She was not in
the business of selling groves ....While the fruit on petitioner's
groves was intended to be eventually sold, it was not primarily
held for sale until it became personal property by actual or
constructive severance from the trees. While, as here, it was
still in process of being grown, it was held only for a potential
future sale. This unpicked fruit could not be included by petitioner in her inventory if on hand at the close of a taxable
year. For all the reasons above stated it was not, at the time of
these sales, property held primarily for sale in the drdinary
course of her business. We repeat, there was no sale of the fruit
as personalty severed from the freehold. The severance made
22Spreckels v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 626 (1942).
2315 T.C. 828 (1950).
24P.H 1950 TC MEr. DEC. f5, 00 (1950).
25p-H 1951 TC MEM. DEC. 51,06.4 (1951).
26Owen v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1951).
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by the Commissioner for tax purposes was purely an artificial
one, which did not in fact occur."
This decision is subject to possible criticism on the ground that it
goes too far in according capital gain treatment under Section 117 (j)
to gain realized from the sale of fruit on trees without regard to the
maturity of the crop when sold. The evidence in the Owen case
disclosed that at the time the first grove in question was sold approximately 27 per cent of the fruit was fully mature, and at the
time the second grove was sold approximately 63 per cent of the fruit
was fully mature.
It would therefore appear that the fruit ready for harvest at the
date the groves were sold constituted property, whether realty or
personalty, held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of business. The profit iealized on the sale ot
such property, whether the fruit was sold in an extraordinary or isolated transaction involving the sale of the entire grove or sold by the
field box as picked, would logically constitute ordinary income and
not capital gain under Section 117 (j).27 The Bureau elected not to
petition the Supreme Court for certiorari in the Owen case, and as
of the date of this writing it is the law in states comprising the Fifth
Circuit. The Bureau of Internal Revenue, needless to say, has not
agreed with the decision and continues to reject claims for refund
of tax paid pursuant to I. T. 3815 and to issue statutory notices of
deficiency against taxpayers not reporting gains from the sale of land
with unharvested crops. There are now pending disposition before
the Bureau a large number of these "fruit on the tree" cases arising
from grove sales in the citrus producing areas of Florida, California,
and Texas. The question will, therefore, be of considerable concern to
taxpayers until the controversy is finally put at rest by Supreme Court
decision.
27For any taxpayer to qualify for the benefits of §117(j), whether before or
after the 1951 amendment, five facts must be shown:

1. The entire property sold was property used in trade or business.
2. The entire property sold was either real property or property of a kind
subject to an allowance for depreciation.
3. The property was held for more than six months.
4. The property was not of a kind includible in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year.
5. The property was not of a kind held by the taxpayer primarily for sale

to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business.
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The Tenth Circuit likewise reversed the Tax Court in the McCoy
case.2 8 It reasoned in part, like the Fifth Circuit, that the taxpayer was
not in the business of producing immature wheat and did not hold
such wheat primarily for sale. In addition, the court embraced the
29
property theory, saying:
"The words 'real property' are used without qualification.
Neither is there anything in the legislative history... indicating
that Congress used the term 'real property' in any other than
its accepted and commonly understood meaning ....
The
sale was a unit sale of a piece of real estate . .. ."
The Bureau is apparently quite concerned over the fact that under
the decisions of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits in the Owen and McCoy
cases the taxpayer not only may treat the entire profit on pre-1951
sales as capital gain but he is also entitled to deduct in full the cost
of raising the crop sold with the land. This means that one dollar
of production costs in the case of sale by an individual will offset two
30
dollars of capital gain realized on sale of the property as a unit.
This result undoubtedly gives the taxpayer a well-deserved advantage, but one that is not unique in the type of sale under discussion.
For example, a calendar-year taxpayer who on June 30th sells at a
profit a truck used for several years in a trucking business is permitted
to charge all allowable depreciation and all ordinary repairs made on
the equipment during the year of sale against his ordinary income.
That this construction of Section 117 (j) is correct is not questioned.
Position of Ninth Circuit
As previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit has recently upheld
the Bureau and the Tax Court in the Watson case. The court expressly agreed with the holding of the majority of the Tax Court that,
regardless of whether fruit on the trees be considered personalty or
realty and whether mature or immature, any profit realized on its
sale for a lump sum as a part of the grove will not qualify for capital
gain treatment under Section 117 (j). The rationale underlying this
holding parallels that of the Tax Court; it is that the fruit on the
28McCoy v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1951).
291d. at 488.
30INT.

REv. CODE §117(b), before amended by §522 (a) (2) of the Revenue Act

of 1951.
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trees, being at all times produced and held for ultimate sale by the
taxpayer, necessarily constitutes property held primarily for sale,
whether mature or immature and regardless of how sold.
The decision goes further than that of the Tax Court and presents
a novel second ground upon which the decision rendered below is
sustained. This theory was presented in answer to the taxpayer's contention that in May, 1944, she ceased to hold the oranges primarily
for sale to customers when she and the co-owners of the grove elected
to hold it with the fruit for a unit sale - a holding of the grove and
crop for a sale not in the ordinary course of any business of the taxpayer. In rejecting this contention, the court said: "Assuming this
decision to sell the property as a unit changed the character of the
holding of the crop, §117 (j) (1) is not satisfied, for the crop was not
held in the non-business sale character for the six months required
by that section."

31

The court seemed to base its conclusion on the theory that the
benefits of Section 117 (j) do not apply, even though the other requirements of the section are met, unless the property sold is held
for more than six months for a purpose other than sale to customers.
Therefore the crop, while growing, was held for sale to customers, and,
even granting that this purpose was changed before the sale, more
than six months had not elapsed between the change of purpose and
the eventual sale.
The court in this connection took direct issue with the Fifth Cir32
cuit ruling in the Owen case:

"... Owen v. Commissioner dealt with a Florida orange grove
and treated the orange crop as appurtenant to the realty when
sold. It reasoned that although the crop may have been held
for sale in the course of trade or business up to a week before
the day of the sale of the land with the crop on the trees, it is
the character of the owner's holding on the day of sale which
is determinative."
At best the theory applied in the Watson case is questionable.
Section 117 (j) treatment is given to the sale of depreciable and real
property used in trade or business and held for more than six months,
which is not property held primarily for sale to customers. There is
3lWatson v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 56, 58 (9th Cir. 1952).
32Ibid.
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nothing in the statute or its legislative history33 to indicate that the
six months holding requirement runs only from the time the property
is held for purposes other than sale primarily to customers.
This interpretation of Section 117 (j) is perhaps a facet of a decision rendered by the Ninth Circuit earlier this year in McGah v.
Commissioner.3 4 A real estate rental company had decided to sell a
part of its rental houses. The Tax Court held that the houses at the
time of sale were held for sale to customers and denied Section 117 (j)
treatment. On appeal the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the
Tax Court, with directions to make a finding of fact as to how long
the houses had been held primarily for sale to customers. Apparently
the court felt that the taxpayer had shown that all the requirements
for reporting its share of the profits on the sale under 117 (j) had been
met except the one requirement that the property must not be held
primarily for sale to customers. In line with the decision in the
Watson case, the court will presumably hold that if the properties in
question had not been held for sale to customers for more than six
months from the date of actual sale the gain would qualify for relief
under Section 117 (j). If the reason for the Ninth Circuit's remand is
correctly appraised, then this is an example of the theory of the Ninth

Circuit operating to the taxpayer's advantage.
Another possible variation of the Ninth Circuit's theory would

occur under the following hypothetical facts. Assume that a taxpayer
converted to rental property on January 1st his personal residence,
which he had purchased several years previously. Assume further that
he succeeds in securing a tenant and then sells the property for a

profit on May 31st of the same year. Presumably the Ninth Circuit
would hold on the authority of the McGah and Watson cases that the
sale would not qualify for capital gain treatment under Section 117 (j).

This would seem to follow on the theory that the property, although
used in trade or business and subject to an allowance for depreciation,
had not been so held for more than six months. The result would
therefore be that the entire gain is taxable as ordinary income. In
the absence of the operation of Section 117 (j), Section 117 (a) express-

ly excludes from the definition of a capital asset property used in
trade or business that is subject to an allowance for depreciation and
33See H.R. RFP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6159 (1942), 1942-2 CuM.
BULL. 572, 445; SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7706 (1942), 1942-2 CuM.

BuLL. 504, 594.
34193 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1952).
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real property so used, without regard to the length of time held.35
The result assumed by the foregoing hypothetical factual situation
undoubtedly runs counter to the thinking of most tax practitioners.
At the time this discussion was in preparation the taxpayer in
the Watson case had not filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Assuming this is done, the Supreme Court may refuse
to hear the case, since the statutory rule governing such transactions
for post-1950 years is clear. The novel interpretation of Section 117 (j),
however, and the confusion that may arise because of this particular
view, plus the conflicts between the circuits, may lead to review if
requested.
Position of Two District Courts
Between the time of the Tax Court opinion in the Watson case
and the Fifth and Tenth Circuit decisions in the Owen and McCoy
cases, two district courts rejected the position of the Bureau in
Irrgang v. Fahs, decided by Judge Barker of the Southern District of
Florida, and Cole v. Smyth, decided by Judge Harris of the Northern
District of California. Both of these cases involved transactions in
which the fruit was wholly immature at the date of the sale of the
property as a unit. In both cases the courts followed the theory that
the growing crop was an integral part of the realty to which it was
attached and that it was not held primarily for sale to
customers; therefore any gain attributable thereto was taxable
under Section 117 (j).
The Bureau filed appeals in both cases. In Irrgang v. Fahs, however, it dismissed its appeal on May 9, 1951.36 The appeal in Cole
v. Smith3- at the date hereof is still pending before the Ninth Circuit
and will in all probability be governed by the decision of that court
in the Watson case, unless that decision is reversed by the Supreme
Court.
LAW FOR TAXABLE YEARS BEGINNING AFTER DECEMBER 31, 1950

Section 323 of the Revenue Act of 1951 amended Section 117 (j)
so as to provide that an unharvested crop sold on land held for more
35See note 2 supra.
36P-H 1951 FED. TAX SERV. t71,102 (1951).
CCH 1952 FED. TAX REP. 144,056 (1952).

375
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than six months is to be considered "property used in trade or business" if sold with the land to the same person at the same time. 38 Capital gain treatment is available also upon an exchange or involuntary
conversion of the land and crop. The amendment, however, is applicable only to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1950.
The length of time for which the crop, as distinguished from the
land, has been held is immaterial. Under the new act no deduction
is allowed which is attributable to the production of the crop, but
the production costs are to be included in the basis of the property
for computing gain or loss.
The requirement that production costs be capitalized applies to
the year of sale or any prior years. Since most commercial crops
mature on an annual basis, the expenses to be disallowed as ordinary
38Pub. L. No. 183, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. §323 (a) (Oct. 20, 1951):
"(a) TRxmANT OF GAIN OR Loss.-Section 117 (j) (relating to sale or exchange
of property used in the trade or business) is hereby amended(1) By inserting immediately before the period at the end of the second
sentence of paragraph (1) thereof the following: 'and unharvested crops to
which paragraph (3) is applicable'; and
(2) By adding at the end thereof a new paragraph to read as follows:
'(3) SALE OF LAND WITH UNHARVESTED cRop.-In the case of an unharvested
crop on land used in the trade or business and held for more than 6 months, if
the crop and the land are sold or exchanged (or compulsorily or involuntarily
converted as described in paragraph (2)) at the same time and to the same
person, the crop shall be considered as "property used in the trade or business."'
"(b) TREATMENT OF DEDUCTIONS.(1) AMENDMENT OF SECTION 24.-Section 24 (relating to items not deductible)
is hereby amended by adding at the end thereof a new subsection to read as
follows:
'(f) SALE OF LAND WITH UNHAR VESTED CRop.-Where an unharvested crop sold
by the taxpayer is considered under the provisions of section 117 (j) (3) as "property
used in the trade or business," in computing net income no deduction (whether
or not for the taxable year of the sale and whether for expenses, depreciation, or
otherwise) attributable to the production of such crop shall be allowed.'

(2)

AMENDMENT

OF SEcTION

113 (b) (1).-Section 113 (b) (1) (relating to ad-

justments to basis) is hereby amended by adding at the end thereof a new subparagraph to read as follows:
'(L) for deductions to the extent disallowed under section 24 (f), notwithstanding the provisions of any other subparagraph of this paragraph.'
"(c) EFFECTrvE DAT.-The amendment made by subsection (a) shall be applicable only with respect to sales, exchanges, and conversions, occurring in taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1950. The amendments made by subsection
(b) shall be applicable to any taxable year for which a deduction is disallowed
by reason of sales, exchanges, or conversions to which subsection (a) is applicable."
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deductions will relate to the year of sale or the year immediately
prior thereto. Apparently a cash basis seller will be forced to pay additional tax for the prior year during which deductions attributable to
the immature crop sold were taken.
There are several quite troublesome problems which will unquestionably arise in the application of this feature of the recent
amendment. One such problem involves determining at precisely what
point a seller of a grove and unharvested crop must begin capitalizing
his production costs in a sale governed by the act. The other involves
determining what constitutes a deduction attributable to the production of the crop within the meaning of the amendment. The question
of determining the precise time at which the seller must begin capitalization of production costs arises from the failure of Congress to define what constitutes a crop.
In the case of citrus property there are two possible stages of
production in which a grove may be sold. One stage occurs during
the period at or before the time the trees bloom, and the other after
the fruit has set or is adhering permanently to the trees. All varieties
of Florida citrus bloom at approximately the same time, either in
February or March, although sometimes groves have a late June or
July bloom because of climatic conditions. At best it is doubtful
whether a grove can be said to have a crop at the time of bloom.
There is always the possibility of severe droppage of bloom on
account of dry weather conditions. It would appear that the logical
time to commence capitalization of production cost is at the point
the fruit has set, for this is in reality the beginning of the crop. Prior
to that time the grove has only a potential crop. This view is in
accordance with the Bureau's position set forth in I.T. 3815, which
provides that "fruit on citrus trees has a potential value from the
time the crop is set ...

until it is harvested, but its actual value can-

not be determined until it is harvested and sold." Thus the seller,
under I.T. 3815, was apparently not required to allocate any part of
his selling price to the fruit unless the fruit had set at the date of
sale. In other words, if the fruit had not set at the time of sale the
transaction would not come within the purview of I.T. 3815, for the
reason that only land and trees would have been sold. It is hoped that
the Commissioner will issue regulations under the present amendment defining his position on this point.
The second facet of this problem involves a determination of
precisely what is meant in the amendment by "a deduction (whether

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol5/iss3/4

14

Frazier: Income Tax Aspects of the Sale of a Citrus Grove and Unharvested
TAX ASPECTS OF CITRUS SALES
or not for the taxable year of sale, and whether for expenses, depreciation, or otherwise) attributable to the production of such crop
...." In the case of citrus horticulture a significant part of all current expenses is attributable to the care and sustenance of the trees
as opposed to the production of the crop itself. For example, would
the expense of pruning the trees have to be capitalized? A part of
all fertilizer and sprays put on the grove is for the care of the trees
and not entirely for the production of the current year's crop. Again,
would local property taxes assessed and levied against the grove, or
interest paid on a purchase money mortgage encumbering the property, have to be capitalized in the year of sale? In other words, does
the statute require the capitalization of all ordinary expenses paid
in the year in which the grove is sold, or may the seller be required
to capitalize only those parts of his current operating expenses directly
attributable to the production the unharvested crop incurred or paid
at the date of sale?
It is of interest to note that John W. Snyder, Secretary of the
Treasury, has addressed a special letter to Senator Walter F. George,
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, 39 recommending that
legislation be enacted requiring sellers of breeding livestock to capitalize their direct production costs, 40 in line with the treatment accorded sellers of farm lands with an unharvested crop. Such a recommendation may be the forerunner of a general amendment to Section
117 (j) forcing all sellers of property used in trade or business to capitalize their currently deductible expenses attributable to the ownership and operation of such property in a year in which sold at a
taxable profit. It is doubtful that the Treasury will ever be wholly
reconciled to the present status of Section 117 (j) permitting one dollar of deductible expense to offset two dollars of long-term gain realized on the sale of property used in trade or business in all such
transactions except the sale of farm land with an unharvested crop.
395 CCH 1952 FED. TAX Rn,. 6240 (1952).
OSec. 324 of the Revenue Act of 1951 includes livestock held for draft, breeding,
or dairy purposes within the definition of property used in trade or business as
defined in Sec. 117 (j) (1), providing the property is held for 12 months or longer.
This was done to assure capital gains treatment on the sale of such animals without
resort to litigation, Albright v. United States, 173 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1949). Inasmuch as no requirement was made in the amendment that the expense of
raising such animals be capitalized, a cash basis livestock owner under existing
law may deduct the current expenses of raising animals the profit from the sale
of which qualifies for capital gains treatment.
4
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It appears possible under Section 117 (j) as amended for the seller
of land with growing crops to have a loss upon that portion of the
selling price attributable to the crop, but such loss would be offset
against any gain realized on the sale of the land and other assets. Section 323 originated in the Senate Finance Committee as an additional
provision to H. R. 4473. The general reference to the amendment set
forth in the report of the Senate Finance Committee explains the
operation of the amendment quite clearly and justifies quotation in
4
part: 1

"Your committee believes that sales of land together with
growing crops or fruit are not such transactions as occur in
the ordinary course of business and should thus result in capital
gains rather than in ordinary income. Section 323 of the bill
so provides.
"Your committee recognizes, however, that when the taxpayer keeps his accounts and makes his returns on the cash
receipts and disbursements basis, the expense of growing the
unharvested crop or the unripe fruit will be deducted in full
from ordinary income, while the entire proceeds from the sale
of the crop, as such, will be viewed as a capital gain. Actually,
of course, the true gain in such cases is the difference between
that part of the selling price attributable to the crop or fruit
and the expenses attributable to its production. Therefore,
your committee's bill provides that no deduction shall be allowed which is attributable to the production of such crops
or fruit, but that the deductions so disallowed shall be included in the basis of the property for the purpose of computing the capital gain."
The amendment is not materially retroactive and hence leaves the
pre-1951 law in the same state of confusion that existed at the time
the Senate Finance Committee considered the measure. The committee was fully cognizant of the split decisions of the Tax Court in
the Watson and McCoy cases and the refusal of the several district
courts to uphold the Bureau's position in Irrgang v. Fahs and Cole v.
Smyth. The committee report is dated September 18, 1951, and was
therefore compiled prior to the decisions of the Fifth Circuit in the
Owen case and the Tenth Circuit in the McCoy case.
41SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 47 (1951).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol5/iss3/4

16

Frazier: Income Tax Aspects of the Sale of a Citrus Grove and Unharvested
TAX ASPECTS OF CITRUS SALES
There is little, if any, indication in the Senate Finance Committee's
report as to whether the committee felt that the position of the Bureau
and the majority of the Tax Court or that of the district courts correctly stated the law in the instant type of transaction. In the McCoy
case the Tenth Circuit interpreted the 1951 amendment as one intended to clarify the law, not change it. The Fifth Circuit in the
Owen case also mentioned the 1951 amendment in a footnote to its
opinion, but only for the purpose of explaining that the controversy
in issue was governed by the law as it existed in 1944, long prior to
the effective date of the amendment.
took direct issue
The Ninth Circuit in the Watson case, however,
42
with the Tenth Circuit McCoy opinion, stating:
"The legislation states that it applies to tax years after December 81, 1950, and the Senate Report accompanying the bill
states that when the amendment is effective there will be an
annual loss in taxes collected of $3,000,000."
At best, it would appear that little or no assistance in resolving
the pre-1951 conflict between the circuits can be gained from the
1951 amendment and the Senate Finance Committee Report accompanying the act. Equally plausible arguments can be made for or
against the Bureau's position by reference to the amendment and
committee reports.
PROBLEMS OF THE PURCHASER

Although this article is primarily devoted to the tax problems of
the seller of a grove with fruit on the trees, reference should be made
to the problems of the purchaser created by the 1951 amendment.
In extending the somewhat liberal provisions of Section 117 (j) to the
seller of an unharvested crop, the purchaser of such property may
be forced to pay a larger tax bill, at least in the year in which the
crop matures and is sold.
The purchaser generally is interested in allocating a substantial
part of his purchase price to the growing crop at the date of acquisition.43 By doing this he can then sell the crop at maturity and re42Watson v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 56, 58 (9th Cir. 1952).
43
1n so doing the purchaser will correspondingly diminish his basis for the
land, trees, and other assets, if any.
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port a relatively small gain on the sale of the crop. 44 This will enable him to recover a large percentage of the acquisition cost of the
property, tax free, in the initial year of operation. 45 There is a rather
old Bureau ruling, O.D. 71446 published in 1920, dealing with the
question of the purchaser's basis for computing gain or loss on the
sale of a crop acquired in the purchase of farm land. The ruling
provides that the gain or loss realized on the subsequent sale of such
crop is the difference between the cost and the selling price realized,
less the expenses of harvesting and marketing. In the absence of an
allocation of the purchase price between the crop and the land, the
fair market value of the growing crop at the date of purchase is recognized as the best basis of the crop. Of course the amount thus allocated to the crop must be deducted from the depreciable basis of
the grove and the cost basis of the land. To date there has been no
public expression by the Bureau indicating a deviation from the
position expressed in O.D. 714.
The 1951 amendment to Section 117 (j) makes no reference to the
proper treatment of these transactions from the purchaser's standpoint. Presumably he is still entitled to offset a portion of the purchase price attributable to the crop against the ordinary income realized from its eventual sale, subject, however, to the ultimate outcome
of litigation now before the Tax Court.
There has been an apparent shift in the Bureau's position regarding O.D. 714, as evidenced by three recent cases. The first of
these is Marion L. Bloxon. 47 The taxpayers bought a pear orchard
in May of 1946 for $75,000 under an agreement that did not apportion
any part of the amount paid to the land, personalty, growing crop,
or other assets. The purchasers subsequently sold the crop and deducted $16,800 as the cost basis of the crop. The Commissioner in
determining the deficiencies against the purchasers disallowed the
$16,800 in its entirety. At the trial, however, he conceded that
$3,257.97, representing a part of the purchase price, should be de441f a loss is incurred it can be used as a net operating loss carry-back for the
preceding taxable year, and unless otherwise exhausted it can be used as a net
operating loss carry over for each of the five succeeding taxable years under the
provisions of INT. REv. CODE §§23 (s) and 122, as amended.
45For example, the purchaser in the Watson case attempted to allocate $120,000
out of a total purchase price of $197,000 to the growing crop, Brief of Petitioner,
p. 8.
463 CUM. BULL.

47P-H 1952 T.C.

49 (1920).
MEMO.

DEc.

52,079 (1952).
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ducted. The case then turned solely upon the proper value to be
assigned to the growing crop, which the court held to be $11,000. The
point of significance in this case is that in so far as the statutory
notice of deficiency was concerned the Commissioner made a determination directly contrary to O.D. 714.
The other two cases, Triple E. Development Co.48 and Louise H.
Edwards,49 both involving Florida taxpayers, are pending before the
Tax Court. The primary issue is the question of whether
the purchaser of farm land may allocate any part of his cost to the
growing crop in the year of acquisition. It is understood that the
Triple E. case involves no dispute as to the value assigned the crop by
the purchaser but solely as to the purchaser's right to allocate any part
of his cost to the growing crop at the date of acquiring his grove. The
Edwards case concerns not only the question of the purchaser's right to
allocate a part of his cost to the growing crop but also raises alternatively the question of proper valuation of the crop should the court
determine that the taxpayer has the right to make such an allocation.
The cases were tried at the hearing calendar of the Tax Court held
in Tampa in February, 1952, and decisions thereon will probably be
rendered in the relatively near future.
It is not known on precisely what theory the Bureau is proceeding on the allocation issue in these two cases. The theory may
be that the growing fruit is an inseparable part of the realty to which
affixed, and that the purchaser does not acquire an item of separate
property upon which to assign a part of his purchase price. Under
this reasoning the only permissible allocation is between land and
any other assets acquired. Such a position would be in direct conflict with O.D. 714, and it is apparently in conflict with the theory
expressed by the Bureau in I.T. 3815 as that ruling affects the seller in
such transactions.
If the fruit crop has reached a stage of maturity at which a realistic value can be assigned to it, it seems extremely doubtful that
the courts will sustain the Bureau's attempt to prevent the purchaser
from allocating a part of his total cost to the growing crop regardless
of the Bureau's theory. The fragmentation rule expressed in Williams
v. McGowan5" is apparently too well entrenched in the law of federal taxation to permit a holding in direct conflict with that case.
4SNo. 26008.
49Nos. 24909-24914.

SoSee note 14 supra.
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In the event that purchasers are successful in maintaining their right
to allocate a part of their cost to the unharvested crop, in spite of
the Bureau's attack there will nevertheless remain a great deal of
room for controversy and litigation as to the proper value to be so
allocated.51
CONCLUSION

In the absence of a reversal by the Supreme Court, taxpayers in
the Fifth and Tenth Circuits are assured of capital gain treatment on
the sale of land with growing crops despite the fact that such sales
were made in years preceding 1951. In view of the Bureau's present
attitude, such treatment cannot be secured without resorting to litigation, either in deficiency proceedings before the Tax Court or in
refund actions before the local district courts. Should review of the
decision of the Ninth Circuit in the Watson case be sought and
granted by the Supreme Court in the coming term, cases in that
circuit involving pre-1951 sales should be held open pending decision by the Supreme Court. If the Ninth Circuit is affirmed, there
will still be considerable room for argument as to how much of the
selling price is properly allocable to the crop from the seller's standpoint. Taxpayers making sales during taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1950, will need only to follow the recent amendment to
Section 117 (j) in order to secure capital gain treatment on any profit
realized or to secure an ordinary deduction for any loss suffered. In
view of the Bureau's apparent repudiation of O.D. 714, purchasers face
the prospect of litigation over their right to allocate a part of their
acquisition costs to an unharvested crop.

51The discussion of the valuation of unharvested citrus is beyond the scope
of this article. Mention should be made, however, of the availability of two pamphlets which should be of assistance to practitioners involved with questions of
valuing unharvested citrus in Florida. Savage, Estimating the Value of Citrus Fruit
As It Develops, Agricultural Extension Service, University of Florida, Gainesville,
sets forth an attempt at a method of approximating fruit value by months from
bloom to mature fruit. Shuler and Townsend, Florida Citrus Fruit Annual Summary 1951, U.S. Dep't of Agricultural Economics, Orlando, Fla., contains a comprehensive statistical summary of the entire Florida citrus industry, covering production and prices by varieties for many years.
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